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Science and a Whole Person Psychology: 
Can Participatory Empiricism Ease the Way Forward?
Editor's Introduction
Jack Schwarz (e.g., 2000, 2001) was a man with the scientifically demonstrated ability to thrust needles through his flesh and cause the resulting 
wounds to close and heal in minutes without pain 
or bleeding (Pelletier & Peper, 1977). This was 
someone I wanted to meet. When I heard that he 
was teaching small weekend workshops near his 
home on the Northern California coast, I saved 
tips from my work until I had enough money to 
attend. To my disappointment, Jack Schwarz—then 
about 70 years of age—no longer performed these 
remarkable feats of self-healing, but he shared a 
story that was in some ways more memorable. 
Jack had discovered some of his unusual 
capacities when he was a teenager in his native 
Holland. He decided to become an entertainer and 
profit by featuring his gifts in a stage show, so he 
saved up money earned by delivering milk, rented a 
large hall in Amsterdam, and advertised that a Dutch 
boy would lie on a bed of nails. When the big night 
came, the hall was completely empty except for a 
couple who had received free tickets in exchange for 
permission to place his flyer in their shop window. 
The show was a failure, but Jack went back to his 
job, saved up his money again, and rented the same 
venue a second time a few years later. This time he 
posed as a fakir from North Africa (a Muslim dervish 
or mendicant) and filled the hall to capacity. 
On May 10, 1940, while Jack was still a 
teenager saving up money for his second performance, 
German tanks rolled into the Netherlands. In occupied 
Holland, Jack joined the resistance and helped locate 
safe houses to shelter Jews. A few months after his 
successful show, Jack was arrested and sent to a labor 
camp in Germany. While there, a fellow prisoner 
contracted typhus. The guards, unwilling to risk 
contact with the deadly disease, put Jack in a cell with 
the ill prisoner to serve as his caretaker. Jack realized 
he had little time to live, as he would almost certainly 
come down with the disease himself after nursing the 
dying man. In that moment, he also accepted that his 
healing capacities were not for his own gain, but a gift 
to be used in selfless service. He determined to care 
for his suffering cellmate with wholehearted devotion. 
The man died, but Jack survived, escaped from the 
labor camp—and from another German prison after 
being re-arrested by the Gestapo for espionage. He 
went on to do decades of research and teaching on 
human health and healing. He credited this prison 
experience with changing the central motivation that 
inspired his life and his actions. 
 Powerful though it was, Jack’s transformative 
experience would be difficult to fully account for in 
the language of psychology. Cognitive, behavioral, 
and neuroscientific work has contributed immensely 
to psychology, yet often marginalizes aspects of self 
that are challenging to describe in cognitive terms 
such as felt sense, intuition, emotional intelligence, 
inspiration, spirituality, mysticism, vision, creativity, 
empathy, and presence. Cognitive skills will help 
with filling out a job application but are less likely to 
determine what one’s lifework will be, what values 
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they will live by, and whom they will love. Life-
defining and life-changing choices are often shaped 
by much more than rational decision-making, 
yet rather than examining these wider aspects of 
experience, scientific psychology has typically given 
priority to what is easy to measure with current tools.
 Transpersonal psychology has a sustained 
interest in these harder-to-describe elements that 
seem more central to human life than their role 
in psychology would suggest. Such capacities are 
often at the edges of the self of everyday experience, 
sometimes associated with subtly or profoundly 
shifted states of consciousness. These also include 
Jack Schwarz’s exceptional capacity to rapidly heal 
wounds to his body, which accords in some measure 
with traditional accounts of allegedly miraculous 
healing. According to documented observation in 
controlled settings, Jack was able to insert large 
needles through his bicep without pain, and actively 
control whether and when the wound bled (Green 
& Green, 1977; Pelletier & Horrigan, 2002; Pelletier 
& Peper, 1977). Simultaneous measurement showed 
that his brain waves switched to alpha when he 
was controlling pain and bleeding, illustrating the 
potential for voluntary control of these functions 
through shift in state of consciousness. He was 
reportedly able to teach others to successfully 
accomplish a similar task (Norris, 1989). 
 Accounts of this type, however carefully 
documented, deserve to be met with proper 
skepticism and critical review; given their remarkable 
potential, they also seem worthy of concerted 
study. Instead, the response within psychology is 
more often silence or outright ridicule. Perhaps in 
reaction to such dismissal, transpersonal circles have 
often characterized the wider field of psychology 
as reductionistic, mechanistic, materialistic, and 
empiricist (e.g., Grof, 1983; Rothberg, 1986; Walsh, 
1997; Wilber, 1999). Empirical work itself seems to 
arouse concern over these potential excesses, which 
may in part explain why fewer than 100 empirical 
papers were published in the two longest-running 
transpersonal journals, combined, during the first 
four decades of the field (Hartelius, Rothe, & Roy, 
2013). As a result, transpersonal psychology has 
been only marginally effective in advancing its 
perspectives, constructs, and theories. 
 With the development of participatory 
thought over the past two decades (e.g., Ferrer, 
2002, 2008, 2011a, 2017), however, there may be 
potential for wider adoption of empirical methods 
within transpersonal psychology with less risk of 
distortion by the shortcomings of empiricist frames. 
Given that participatory offers not only a philosophy, 
but a tolerant and inclusive framework within which 
to hold multiple epistemologies—including those 
of science—with reduced hierarchy, it may now 
be possible to approach transpersonal topics from 
a multi-epistemic stance as has been proposed by 
some scholars in the field (Ferrer, 2002, 2014; Mack, 
1993; Vaughan, in Caplan, Hartelius, & Rardin, 
2003). 
 It is critical to understand that the challenge 
of implementing competing epistemologies within 
the scientific discipline of psychology goes well 
beyond the work of considering various cultural 
perspectives in social and political contexts. 
For example, if one were to include intuitive 
epistemologies along with empiricism (Vaughan, 
in Caplan, Hartelius, & Rardin, 2003), which 
interpretive frame takes priority if intuition remains 
at odds with empirical evidence? If a transpersonal 
version of empiricism rests on “emotions, creativity, 
imagination, and intuitions” (Cunningham, 2015, p. 
100) as firmly as it does on critical thinking, then 
how is psychology to exclude imaginative fraud 
or creative misrepresentations? Proponents of this 
approach have yet to articulate a way forward with 
respect to these difficulties.
As part of the discussion it may be helpful 
to consider positions held by the field’s most 
prominent proponents of participatory thought, 
Jorge N. Ferrer (e.g., 2002, 2008, 2011a, 2017), and 
empirical methods, Harris L. Friedman (e.g., 2002, 
2013/2015)—positions that are currently in some 
tension with each other. I have worked closely 
with both Ferrer and Friedman for many years and 
have the highest respect for both as excellent but 
very different scholars. I use participatory thought 
in my own thinking and writing, and am at the 
same time a strong proponent of cultivating more 
empirical research to test and refine the constructs 
and theories of transpersonal psychology. Indeed, 
it was a participatory frame that enabled me to 
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recognize empirical science as simply another 
situated approach to knowledge—one that is peer 
to many others, if indispensable within psychology. 
My intention here is to share with the reader a 
stance that appears to be compatible with both 
empiricism and participatory thought—what I have 
called participatory empiricism. 
In brief, a participatory stance views scientific 
empiricism as a useful approximation of reality 
offered from a particular cultural and philosophical 
location. While empiricism holds priority within 
scientific disciplines such as psychology, its priority 
is situational rather than ontological. Ontologically, 
empiricism has no priority over, say, Buddhism or 
perennialism or yoga, but situationally, within a 
scientific psychology, empiricism is the currency 
of the context. In a similar way, it would be out of 
place to use a strictly scientific argument in a debate 
over a point of Buddhist doctrine among geshes 
in a Buddhist monastery. Buddhism is no more or 
less true than other traditions, but within Buddhist 
institutions, Buddhist assumptions hold situational 
priority. Within psychology, then, science has just 
as much right to be empiricist as Buddhism has to 
be Buddhist. 
If transpersonal psychology is to incorporate 
multiple epistemologies, then, it cannot be accom-
plished by offering these as multiple-choice options 
so that empirical standards are accepted when their 
results are pleasing, and rejected in favor of preferred 
beliefs, intuitions, emotions, imagination, or creativity 
when empirical results are discomfiting. This latter 
seems to be the way in which the notions of plural 
epistemologies and multiple ways of knowing have at 
times been employed within the transpersonal field: 
as permissive latitude to indulge in uncritical meta-
physical speculation, experientialism, essentialism, 
or specious reasoning in order to circumvent 
thorny challenges with comforting solutions (e.g., 
Blackstone, 2006; Cunningham, 2015; Taylor, 2016, 
2017a-c; Wilber, 2006). 
What the transpersonal field can do—
and this might be instructive for other domains 
of psychology as well—is implement plural 
epistemologies as multiple sets of standards against 
which constructs, theories, and evidence should 
be simultaneously measured (cf. Hartelius, Thouin-
Savard, & Crouch, 2018). For example, a study may 
be empirically sound, but may pose its research 
question in a manner that privileges unconscious 
assumptions based in a particular culture or state of 
consciousness (cf. Tart, 1972), or that dismisses entire 
categories of lived experience (e.g., Tart, 2004). 
It is reasonable to ask that studies of experiential 
phenomena be both empirically sound and fully 
consonant with lived experience, or that studies of 
Buddhist meditation offer doctrinal perspectives 
along with psychological interpretations. Agree-
ments between divergent epistemologies may yield 
particularly rich insights, and differences may lead 
to useful new research questions.
Another simple strategy is to require 
that claims based in non-empirical perspectives 
be clearly situated within their own frames. For 
example, if a metaphysical perspective is offered, 
it should be contextualized as such along with the 
caveat that the view is entirely speculative, and 
an explanation of what value it might provide—
for example, hermeneutical value. Examples are 
Taylor's (2018) and Barratt's (2019; this issue) 
papers, where speculative interpretations of subtle 
somatic experiences are carefully identified as 
such. Similarly, if a religious perspective is included, 
it should be unambiguously situated within the 
context of its own tradition, rather than being put 
forward as psychological. For example, for the 
IJTS issue on Integral Yoga Psychology, edited by 
Debashish Banerji (2018; Vol. 37/1), the editorial 
staff worked with each submitting author to ensure 
that the content was offered within a critical frame, 
with hermeneutical contexts and metaphysical 
claims identified as such, while also authentically 
reflecting Aurobindonian thought in a way that 
remained resonant for members of the Integral 
Yoga community. This process of discernment and 
disclosure could go far toward facilitating a critically 
sound approach to multiple epistemologies within 
transpersonal psychology.
Before considering how a participatory 
empiricism might mitigate some of the tension 
between participatory and empirical perspectives, 
it may be helpful to review how these two stances 
fit within the development of the transpersonal 
field. Four successive orientations have been 
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identified, and each characterized briefly in terms of 
its contributions and liabilities.
Four Orientations in Transpersonal Psychology
From its inception, the transpersonal field has been no stranger to the challenge of multiple 
epistemologies. It has wrestled with the fact that 
phenomena of human spirituality are situated within 
scores of different philosophies and metaphysical 
frames. Its vision of combining the philosophy of 
the East with the science of the West is complicated 
by the fact that Eastern wisdom comes in six major 
schools of Indian religion that encompass three 
branches of Buddhism—and this reflects just one of 
several major Eastern traditions. Its efforts to meet 
this challenge have given rise to four major impulses 
within the field: depth psychology, perennialism, 
participatory thought, and empirical methods. While 
the primary focus here will be how participatory 
thought and empirical methods can be seen as 
complementary, it is worth reviewing the first two 
approaches. 
The early transpersonal field was situated 
within a depth psychology framework—so named 
because it takes into account unconscious aspects of 
mind (Ellenberger, 1970). Depth psychology explains 
human spirituality by suggesting that it represents 
underlying depths within humanity, or within 
life itself (Washburn, 2003). A depth psychology 
perspective is reflected in the thought of Stanislav 
Grof, David Michael Levin, Michael Washburn, 
and the early Ken Wilber; it can also be applied to 
approaches based on the work of Eastern scholars 
such as Sri Aurobindo Ghose, such as Assagioli’s 
(e.g., 1969) psychosynthesis and Banerji’s (2018) 
integral yoga psychology. Despite their value in 
providing an uplifting explanatory frame, depth 
approaches describe dynamics thought to be outside 
of conscious awareness—and so necessarily remain 
largely speculative and metaphysical. That is, these 
are comprised primarily of lived experience and 
culturally situated socially constructed meaning, with 
few avenues for examination by empirical science.
Midway through the transpersonal field’s 
first decade a second approach was introduced: 
Wilber’s (e.g., 1975) version of perennialist thought, 
which despite considerable evolution and efforts 
to reject the label, remains perennialist in structure 
(Hartelius, 2017a). If depth psychology sought to 
understand human resources below the conscious 
mind, perennialism aspired to unify these depth 
elements into a grand schema that ascribes these and 
all the world’s spiritual traditions to a singular spiritual 
source. Perennialist thought takes many forms, but its 
essence is that spiritual traditions use culturally diverse 
language and symbols to represent what is essentially 
the journey to a single spiritual ultimate (Ferrer, 
2000, 2002). It suggests that a single truth underlies 
all traditions and is the goal of all paths. This view 
was the primary philosophical orientation within the 
field (Rothberg, 1986) until around 2000. By now 
numerous serious issues with the viability of various 
perennialist solutions have been identified, such as 
the fact that these are essentialist, experientialist, 
and metaphysical models that offer little more than 
speculative pattern definition and circular reasoning 
as their best evidence (see Ferrer, 2002; Ferrer, 2011b; 
Hartelius, 2017b; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). While 
unsuitable within psychology, these still serve as 
inspiring spiritual visions for some New-Age oriented 
communities (Hartelius, 2015, 2017c). 
The alternative that has emerged and met 
with considerable success in transpersonal thought 
is a participatory philosophy as articulated by 
Ferrer (e.g., 2001, 2002, 2008, 2011a; 2011b; Ferrer 
& Sherman, 2008) and others (e.g., Heron, 1992, 
2006; Kelly, 2008; Kremer, 2007; Tarnas, 1991). 
Participatory thought understands the world to 
be a dynamic and open-ended living system that 
is continually involved in cocreating itself (Ferrer, 
2011a), that mind and nature are necessarily woven 
of the same fabric (cf. Bateson, 1979), and that 
therefore consciousness in some form goes all the 
way down to the basic materials of physicality 
(Chalmers, 1995; De Quincey, 1994; Heron, 1992). 
A particular contribution of participatory 
thought is its challenge to Cartesian dualism—
the notion that the human person is some sort of 
intellectual spirit of a very different substance than 
the biological machine it inhabits. Even though 
Descartes himself likely was not a substance dualist 
(Strawson, 2006a-b, 2019), early European modernist 
philosophy adopted this form of dualism and credited 
Descartes. Separated from the natural world, the 
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rational mind could supposedly be a neutral agent 
gathering objective information (cf. Nagel, 1986)—
fueling an exuberant, naïve objectivism and the 
tantalizing Enlightenment prospect of absolutely 
certain universal knowledge. Yet if consciousness 
itself is actually part of the world then knowledge 
is located in the world, and universal knowledge is 
unattainable because the detached neutral observer 
needed to gain such knowledge is fictional (cf. 
Haraway, 1988; Nagel, 1986; Rorty, 1979). The 
locatedness of knowledge makes Cartesian dualism 
impossible, just as it collapses the divide between 
spirit and matter, mind and body. 
A limitation of participatory thought is that, 
like Cartesianism, it is situated in what is clearly 
a Western cultural frame. A participatory stance 
“invokes mutual respect for the ways in which 
each individual and each community brings their 
particular insights and contributions” (Hartelius & 
Ferrer, 2013), yet this goal is itself a value of the 
secular humanism that developed from Europe’s 
Enlightenment—one eschewed by any number of 
orthodox religious or traditional societies around 
the world. In addition to this philosophy Ferrer has 
offered three criteria by which to evaluate spiritual 
traditions: how well they combat egocentrism, 
how well they counteract dissociation from the 
body and other aspects of the whole person, and 
how effectively they “foster ecological balance, 
social and economic justice, religious and political 
freedom, class and gender equality, and other 
fundamental human rights” (Ferrer, 2011a, p. 7). The 
very notion of human rights stems also from the Age 
of Enlightenment, and the various rights enumerated 
trace much of the history of how that concept has 
developed in Western society since the 17th century. 
In addition, Sherman (2008) traced the roots of a 
participatory perspective to Greek philosophy, 
and Tarnas (1991) attributed inspiration for its 
contemporary form to thinkers of the Romantic era. 
This limitation illustrates participatory thought’s 
own acknowledged situatedness (Hartelius & Ferrer, 
2013), which does not reduce its utility for the study 
of human spirituality in its diversities.
Shortly after the introduction of 
participatory thought Friedman formally introduced 
empirical methods as a transpersonal approach 
with his 2002 paper, Transpersonal Psychology 
as a Scientific Field. This paper complements his 
work and that by Douglas MacDonald and others 
on describing and developing assessments and 
constructs relevant to  transpersonal psychology 
(e.g., Friedman & MacDonald, 1997; Gabrhel & 
Jezek, 2016; MacDonald, 2000, 2009; MacDonald 
et al., 2015; MacDonald & Friedman, 2002, 2009, 
2013; MacDonald, Friedman, & Kuentzel, 1999; 
MacDonald & Kuentzel, 1999; MacDonald, LeClair, 
Holland, Alter, & Friedman, 1995; Lopez, Jodhar, & 
MacDonald, 2017; Mendez & MacDonald, 2012, 
2017; St. John & MacDonald, 2007). Friedman’s 
position is that transpersonal psychology, as a 
subdiscipline of scientific psychology, should adopt 
and use empirical scientific methods to study 
transpersonal topics. 
Friedman’s subsequent papers promoting 
empirical work show recognition of the limitations 
and disadvantages of these methods alongside his 
affirmation of their pragmatic value (e.g., Friedman, 
2013/2015). He has acknowledged that empirical 
science is only capable of “modest generalizations” 
(p. 57), and of describing how things function within 
a limited context; it is not able to provide universal 
explanations. A scientific approach is also incapable 
of studying phenomena that are believed to exist, 
but that cannot be measured in any way. A scientific 
psychology could study the impact of belief in 
certain metaphysical or supernatural phenomena, 
it could study reports by individuals who claim to 
have experienced those phenomena—perhaps in 
some shifted state of consciousness—but it could 
not directly study things that do not appear in some 
way within the natural world. He has also affirmed 
that science cannot escape empiricism, in the 
sense that conceptualizing requires a knower and 
something that is known, perpetuating a subject-
object divide. 
 Ferrer’s participatory thought (e.g., 2002) 
and Friedman’s empirical approach (e.g., 2013/2015) 
have both critiqued perennialist approaches and 
offered alternatives that avoid some of the associated 
metaphysical pitfalls. Participatory thought and 
empirical methods are potentially complementary 
in that each targets a different level in the 
development of knowledge: participatory is a broad 
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philosophical frame without a specific method, 
and empirical methods can be used within various 
philosophical frames. Despite this, and as noted, 
some disagreements between the two perspectives 
have emerged in their early engagement, particularly 
over the issue of empiricism.
Friedman’s Empirical Methods 
versus Ferrer’s Participatory Thought
The first engagement between Friedman and Ferrer came with Friedman’s (2013/2015) 
characterization of participatory thought as 
promoting “mini-theories that avoid explaining much 
of anything” (p. 55)—a critique later sharpened 
into the label, “a theory of nothing” (Friedman, 
2018, p. 231). What Friedman has accurately 
grasped here is that if knowledge is located, then 
every knower, every point of sentience, holds its 
own unique context and perspective (cf. Nagel, 
1986). While this offers a different starting point 
for knowledge construction than the imaginary 
objective self who holds a “view from nowhere” 
(Nagel, 1986), it is by no means the end of that 
process. Each participant offers an approximation of 
shared reality from their own specific location, and 
together with other knowers and the world itself 
a shared local reality is co-constructed—one that 
offers negotiated generalizations. The emphasis on 
located knowledge is no denial of or limitation on 
the building of knowledge within shared realities, 
but a call for greater respect for the differences 
that individuals and communities bring to such 
processes. Friedman’s (2018) critique appears to 
serve as a convenient rhetorical device that allowed 
him to contrast participatory as a “theory of nothing” 
with perennialism as a “theory of everything” (p. 
231) so he could offer his own solution of middle-
range theory as the porridge that is just right.
 Friedman's (2013/2015) critique appears to be 
based on concern that Ferrer's approach "explicitly 
does not seek to generalize results from its data" (p. 57), 
which is a bit like complaining that a recipe written 
on paper does not taste good, or that architectural 
renderings of a Formula One racecar do not move 
when you push on the drawing of the gas pedal. 
Whether it is dinner or a fast automobile that is 
being designed, it is helpful to lay out the conceptual 
ground beforehand—in preparation for cooking or 
starting to assemble a vehicle chassis. Participatory 
thought aims at careful evaluation of the conceptual 
ground of transpersonal research in preparation for 
that research, not in lieu of it. Friedman himself has 
noted that empirical methods cannot yield universal 
knowledge, a conclusion that requires thinking 
about how knowledge construction works, apart 
from the enterprise of actually doing research. His 
impatience with a thorough articulation of this 
same type of subject perhaps reflects his passion for 
getting on with the research itself, but architecture 
is just as noble a profession as building. 
In response to this critique, Ferrer (2014) 
has offered a detailed analysis of philosophical 
assumptions in Friedman’s work, in the process 
laying out a thorough and careful articulation 
of reservations regarding empirical work and 
science in general that are longstanding within 
the transpersonal community. By way of example, 
Ferrer’s (2002) earlier critiques of perennialism also 
included charges that such models failed to fully 
purge empiricism, leaving behind a residue of subtle 
Cartesianism (p. 28). Ferrer (2014) has affirmed 
the value of empirical research, but claimed that 
following Friedman’s proposal to turn the field 
“into a modern scientific discipline … effectively 
binds transpersonal psychology to a naturalistic 
metaphysical worldview that is hostile to most 
spiritual knowledge claims” (p. 152). The charge 
here is that holding the transpersonal field to the 
standards of empirical science requires subscribing 
to a reality in which mind and body, spirit and matter, 
are irrevocably separate—one that has collapsed 
spirit and consciousness into imaginary figments. 
It should be clear that the tension is not 
between empiricism as a limited Western worldview 
and participatory thought as a universal philosophy, 
but between two different branches of Western 
thought; the selfsame Age of Enlightenment that 
midwifed Friedman’s empiricism into the West also 
birthed the values of rational tolerance espoused 
by Ferrer. Nor is it a contest between hierarchical 
and non-hierarchical systems, since the rejection 
of hierarchies among spiritual traditions creates a 
different sort of hierarchy by elevating tolerance. 
The latter is not merely hypothetical, as a student 
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once shared with me that their traditional religious 
beliefs had been held up to ridicule by other 
students after a lecture on participatory thought on 
grounds that traditional systems were metaphysical 
and oppressive—so why would anyone remain 
committed to them? This sort of intolerant behavior 
is, of course, entirely inimical to the aims of a 
participatory stance, but it illustrates the point that 
even participatory thought cannot entirely eliminate 
hierarchies. 
Instead, the differences between Friedman's 
and Ferrer's positions seem as if they may be at 
least as much about framing and emphasis as 
about substance. (I fully expect both scholars to 
take issue with this framing of their differences as 
well, as such is the nature of scholarly debate.) The 
limits on the explanatory powers of empiricism that 
Friedman (2013/2015) has acknowledged, and his 
affirmation of its applicability within non-ordinary 
states of consciousness, seem at least moderately 
congruent with Ferrer’s (2014) view of empirical 
methods. Consider Ferrer’s (2014) example of how 
transpersonal research might be pursued beyond 
what he considered the limits of empiricism. He 
proposed that “a team of researchers focusing their 
attention on the possible occurrence of external 
visions” might take “a visionary medicine—such as 
San Pedro or ayahuasca” (p. 175) and then compare 
their experiences, leaving open how these might be 
interpreted within various assumptions about reality. 
A very similar project might well be pursued under 
Friedman’s (2013/2015) relatively open definition of 
empiricism: 
To be seen as empirical data, all that is required 
is that information be amenable (or potentially 
amenable) to the senses, while it needs to be 
recognized that the senses can operate under 
many different consciousness states (e.g., 
under the influence of psychedelic substances; 
Friedman, 2006). As long as phenomenological 
data from an alternate state can be accessed with 
some degree of reliability (again, a prerequisite 
for being a scientifically valid observation), 
either by the same researcher across time or by 
others, it can be studied scientifically. (p. 61)
There seems little cause for disagreement here.
 Where some of the confusion arises is 
an apparent difference in the use of the term, 
supernatural. Friedman’s (2013/2015) use of the 
term implies a wholly speculative construction or 
interpretation, one that cannot be accessed by means 
of inner or outer senses under any circumstances. 
Ferrer’s (2014) use of supernatural, on the other 
hand, seems to be more synonymous with what 
might be termed supernormal—that is, experiences 
that are available to inner or outer senses under 
exceptional circumstances. As in Ferrer's example 
cited earlier, certain plant medicines may induce 
visionary experiences which, though quite outside 
of ordinary experience, are still within experience. 
Friedman’s version of empiricism embraces study 
of the supernormal, and rejects only the study of 
the wholly speculative—that which cannot be 
experienced under any circumstances, or in any state 
of consciousness. When differences in definition 
are accounted for, their positions on notions that are 
wholly speculative, and experiential phenomena 
accessed under exceptional circumstances, seem 
congruent.
 Another area of difference in language 
concerns objectivity, which Ferrer (2014) has 
identified as a liability and Friedman (2013/2015) 
has named as necessity. On this basis Friedman 
has characterized Ferrer’s work as some version of 
intersubjective journalism, and Ferrer has in turn 
implied that Friedman represents a sort of Western 
scientific colonialism seeking to appropriate 
spiritual resources from other cultures into its own 
objectivist knowledge system. It may be, however, 
that the objectivity decried by Ferrer is not entirely 
identical with that promoted by Friedman.
 For example, if knowing is limited and 
located so that universal knowledge is not possible, if 
there is no “view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986), then 
truly objective knowledge, wholly unaffected by 
the subject who knows, is a fictional goal. This does 
not mean that objectivity is a meaningless concept. 
Systematic measurements of elevation taken from a 
thousand different points spread across Japan would 
provide considerably better information about its 
geography than a single measurement from some 
random location. Similarly, a thousand responses to 
a validated scale on dating satisfaction by residents 
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of Boston collected on the basis of a statistically 
valid sampling plan will say more about what it is 
like to date in that city than tales of romance a friend 
from Beacon Hill shares over tea or a beer. Careful 
measurements of a thousand data points—whether 
geographical or sociological—will provide data 
that are more objective in the sense that they are 
more likely to reflect the what it is like of a larger 
shared reality than what it is like for some individual 
or some unique point on a map (cf. Nagel, 1974). 
Data that are more objective are less idiosyncratic, 
and more generalizable, but they are no closer to 
the imaginary idealization of an objectivity that 
does not exist—one in which an immaterial knower 
can dispassionately survey all the world without 
affecting, being affected by, or even being located 
in that world.
Friedman (2013/2015), in keeping with his 
work as an empirical researcher, seems to have 
used the term objectivity in the pragmatic sense 
of greater generalizability, and in the common 
sense that research involves an observer and 
something that is observed. Ferrer’s (2014) interest 
in emancipatory philosophy, on the other hand, 
appears to have focused his view on the fact that 
an ideal objectivity does not actually exist, and 
that the fiction of objectivity has been used to 
rationalize the discounting of human suffering and 
human spirituality, along with the exploitation of 
individuals and communities. Likely, both are true: 
more data points tend to yield results that are more 
generalizable, and the myth of an ideal objectivity—
which has no particular utility in research—has 
served to condone dismissals of lived experience 
as well as personal and social injustices. The 
differences between Friedman and Ferrer seems to 
reflect more about how differently their focus rests, 
even when using the same term, and less about any 
implications for transpersonal research. 
While there are no doubt many points of 
difference remaining between Ferrer and Friedman, 
a careful reading of Friedman’s (e.g., 2013/2015) 
affirmation of empiricism and Ferrer’s (2014) 
critique of the same suggests that there may also 
be more than a few similarities—and that some of 
the apparent disagreements, if considered carefully, 
may dwindle into insignificance.
A Way Forward, Perhaps
Scientific empiricism, when considered from a well-tempered perspective that acknowledges 
its utility while curbing its hubris, may turn out to 
be reasonably consistent with how a participatory 
view might hold it—as yet another situated way to 
approximate shared reality. Holding empiricism as 
a limited but useful tool—and acknowledging it as 
the conventional emic perspective of the culture 
of science—does not prohibit the use of plural 
epistemologies, so that rationality and empirical 
evidence become a minimum standard of discourse 
rather than a maximum ideal. Philosophy is always 
implicit in empirical work, and influential studies 
often entail a good amount of intution, imagination, 
and creativity in their design. In a participatory 
frame, empirical discourse can include all of these 
and more—lived experience, hermeneutics, even 
metaphysical speculation—so long as these are 
critically situated and not advanced as claims that 
demand acceptance without support or scrutiny.
These do not seem like onerous requirements in a 
scholarly context. 
 There will still be some in the transpersonal 
field who see empirical research as a sort of "gateway 
drug" likely to lead down some slippery slope to 
rampant intolerance of the very topics that the field 
has championed. Yet it may not be the methodology 
of empirical science as much as its conceit that has at 
times evoked its rejection in transpersonal circles. To 
be sure, holistic communities are equally vulnerable to 
inflation, on occasion appearing to embrace spiritual 
elitism in response to a dismissive scientific culture. A 
participatory stance may be of some modest service by 
offering opportunity to set aside both species of hubris. 
Were the culture of empirical science to be 
more informed by the values of tolerance toward 
other situated reality frames, tolerance born from a 
vision of self-evident human rights, then these twin 
children of the Age of Enlightenment might usher in a 
science better suited to the study of the whole person 
amidst the cultural complexities of the 21st century. 
If careful, rigorous empiricism were accompanied 
by the cultivation of humility, respect, curiosity, 
open-mindedness, and active efforts to “try on” 
other assumptions about reality in an appreciative 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies xiScience and a Whole Person Psychology
spirit, then it might become something akin to a 
participatory empiricism—a science that might not 
need to marginalize or reject exceptional human 
capacities even when these were demonstrated and 
documented in controlled conditions. 
It is possible that such an empirical science 
might come closer to acceptability by both Friedman 
and Ferrer—and perhaps to more of the transpersonal 
field as well. Transpersonal scholars need not wait 
for the mainstream of psychology to transform in 
these ways; it is possible for those within the field to 
embrace and model a version of science that is both 
epistemologically tolerant and empirically sound. With 
a little creativity and imagination it may turn out that 
we are, after all, the ones we have been waiting for. 
In This Issue
This issue opens with a new installment to Harry Hunt's series, Intimations of a Spiritual New 
Age, titled, Martin Heidegger's Phenomenology 
of Numinous/Being Experience and the "Other 
Beginning" of a Futural Planetary Spirituality. This 
follows Hunt's 2017 paper on universalized Christian 
mysticism in the life and work of Simone Weil, and 
his two 2018 papers on Wilhelm Reich's efforts to 
develop a bio-energetic spiritual psychology. This 
important series considers several formative figures 
in the envisioning of a this-worldly mysticism and 
futural New Age spirituality between the 1930s and 
1950s. Hunt considers Heidegger's later work on 
"the cognitive-noetic meaning of numinous-mystical 
feeling" (p. 2) as part of his search for Western 
spiritual renewal and re-sacralization of nature. Hunt 
faces up squarely to Heidegger's earlier embrace of 
National Socialism, effectively situating this episode 
within the trajectory of his intellectual and personal 
development. The result is a nuanced and insightful 
treatment of Heidegger's vision that includes his 
warning—relevant for a transpersonal psychology—
against excessive subjectivism, psychic adventuring, 
and focusing on the exotic and unusual for its own 
sake. 
 Following this is a contribution by Jenny 
Wade on The Castrated Gods and their Castration 
Cults: Revenge, Punishment, and Spiritual Supre-
macy. In order to understand a myth properly, each 
theme and image deserves to be situated within 
its own historical, cultural, and literary context. 
Wade's piece acknowledges this, but instead 
engages in a cross-cultural survey of the types of 
meaning attached to divine emasculation based 
on how a variety of myths explicitly describe the 
narratives of emasculated gods and how castration 
changed their divine powers. Her treatment is in this 
way more hermeneutical than historical or literary, 
as an inquiry into what these mythic themes might 
convey to a modern reader. She concluded that 
while "the messages vary, but at their core they are 
stories of transformation and liberation" (p. 51).
Glenn Hartelius, Main Editor
California Institute of Integral Studies
References
Assagioli, R. (1969). Symbols of transpersonal 
experiences. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 
1(1), 33–45.
Banerji, D. (2018). Introduction to the special topic 
section on integral yoga psychology: The 
challenge of multiple integrities. International 
Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 37(1), 27–37. 
https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2018.37.1.27
Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and nature: A necessary 
unity. New York, NY: Bantam Books.
Blackstone, J. (2006). Intersubjectivity and nonduality 
in the psychotherapeutic relationship. Journal of 
Transpersonal Psychology, 38(1), 25–40.
Caplan, M., Hartelius, G., & Rardin, M.-A. (2003). 
Contemporary viewpoints on transpersonal 
psychology. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 
35(2), 143–162.
Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of 
consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
2(3), 200–219.
Cunningham, P. (2015). Empirical rationalism and 
transpersonal empiricism: Bridging the two 
epistemic cultures of transpersonal psychology. 
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 47(1), 83–
120.
De Quincey, C. (1994). Consciousness all the way 
down? An analysis of McGinn’s critique of 
panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 1(2), 217–229.
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies xii  Hartelius 
Ellenberger, H. F. (1970). The discovery of the 
unconscious: The history and evolution of 
dynamic psychiatry. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Ferrer, J. N. (2000). The perennial philosophy 
revisited. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 
32(1), 7–30.
Ferrer, J. N. (2001). Toward a participatory vision 
of human spirituality. ReVision: A Journal of 
Consciousness and Transformation, 24(2), 15–26.
Ferrer, J. N. (2002). Revisioning transpersonal theory: 
A participatory vision of human spirituality. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Ferrer, J. N. (2008). Spiritual knowing as participatory 
enaction: An answer to the question of religious 
pluralism. In J. N. Ferrer & J. H. Sherman (Eds.), 
The participatory turn: Spirituality, mysticism, 
religious studies (pp. 135–169). Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press.
Ferrer, J. N. (2011a). Participatory spirituality and 
transpersonal theory: A ten-year retrospective. 
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 43(1), 
1–34. 
Ferrer, J. N. (2011b). Participation, metaphysics, and 
enlightenment: Reflections on Ken Wilber’s 
recent work. Transpersonal Psychology Review, 
14(2), 3–24.
Ferrer, J. N. (2014). Transpersonal psychology, 
science, and the supernatural. Journal of 
Transpersonal Psychology, 46(2), 152–186.
Ferrer, J. N. (2017). Participation and the mystery. New 
York, NY: State University of New York Press.
Ferrer, J. N., & Sherman, J. H. (Eds.). (2008). 
Introduction: The participatory turn in spirituality, 
mysticism, and religious studies. In J. N. Ferrer 
& J. H. Sherman (Eds.), The participatory turn: 
Spirituality, mysticisim, religious studies (pp. 1-78). 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Friedman, H. L. (2002). Transpersonal psychology as 
a science. International Journal of Transpersonal 
Studies, 21, 175–187. https://doi.org/10.24972/
ijts.2002.21.1.175
Friedman, H. L. (2015). Further developing 
transpersonal psychology as a science: Building 
and testing middle-range transpersonal theories. 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 
34(1–2), 55–64. (Original work published 2013) 
https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2015.34.1-2.55
Friedman, H. L. (2018). Transpersonal psychology as 
a heterodox approach to psychological science: 
Focus on the construct of self-expansiveness and 
its measure. Archives of Scientific Psychology, 6, 
230–242. https://doi.org/10.1037/arc0000057
Friedman, H. L., & MacDonald, D. A. (1997). 
Toward a working definition of transpersonal 
assessment. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 
29(2), 105–122.
Gabrhel, V., & Ježek, S. (2016). Factor validity 
and internal consistency of theExpressions 
of Spirituality Inventory – Revised (ESI-R): 
The Czech context. International Journal of 
Transpersonal Studies, 35(2), 118–126.
Green, E., & Green, A. (1977). Beyond biofeedback. 
Boca Raton, FL: Knoll. 
Grof, S. (1983). East and West: Ancient wisdom 
and modern science. Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology, 15(1), 13-36.
Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The 
science question in feminism and the privilege 
of partial perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 
575–599. https://doi.org/10.2307/3178066
Hartelius, G. (2015). A startling new role for Wilber’s 
integral model: Or, how I learned to stop worrying 
and love perennialism (A response to Abramson). 
Transpersonal Psychology Review, 17(1), 38–48.
Hartelius, G. (2017a). Zombie perennialism: An 
intelligent design for psychology? A further 
response to Taylor’s soft perennialism. Interna-
tional Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 36(2), 93–
110. https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.93
Hartelius, G. (2017b). Circular reasoning is not 
the uroboros: Rejecting perennialism as a 
psychological theory. International Journal of 
Transpersonal Studies, 36(2), 121–135. https://
doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.121
Hartelius, G. (2017c). Taylor’s soft perennialism: 
Psychology or New Age spiritual vision? Interna-
tional Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 36(2), 136–
146. https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.136
Hartelius, G. & Ferrer, J. N. (2013). Transpersonal 
philosophy: The participatory turn. In H. L. 
Friedman & G. Hartelius (Eds.). The Wiley-
Blackwell handbook of transpersonal psychology 
(pp. 187–202). Malden, MA: Wiley & Sons. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118591277.ch10
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies xiiiScience and a Whole Person Psychology
Hartelius, G., Rothe, G., & Roy, P. J. (2013). A 
brand for the burning: Defining transpersonal 
psychology. In H. L. Friedman & G. Hartelius 
(Eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell handbook 
of transpersonal psychology (pp. 3–22). 
Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell. https://doi.
org/10.1002/9781118591277.ch1
Hartelius, G., Thouin-Savard, M. I., & Crouch, C. 
R. (2018). Rigor in the multicultural psychology 
of the whole person: Embracing the challenge. 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 
37(1), iii–viii. https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2018.37.1.iii
Heron, J. (1992). Feeling and personhood: Psychology 
in another key. London, UK: Sage.
Heron, J. (2006). Participatory spirituality: A farewell to 
authoritarian religion. Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press.
Kelly, S. (2008). Participation, complexity, and the 
study of religion. In J. N. Ferrer & J. H. Sherman 
(Eds.), The participatory turn: Spirituality, 
mysticism, religious studies (pp. 113–133). 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Kremer, J. (2007). Ironies of true selves in trans/
personal knowing: Decolonizing trickster 
presences in the creation of indigenous 
participatory presence. ReVision: A Journal of 
Consciousness and Transformation, 29(4), 23–
33. https://doi.org/10.3200/REVN.29.4.23-33
López, E., Jódar, R., & MacDonald, D. A. (2017). 
Psychometric properties of a Spanish adaptation 
of the Expressions of Spirituality Inventory–
Revised (ESI–R). International Journal of 
Transpersonal Studies, 36(1), 110–121. https://
doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.1.110
MacDonald, D. A. (2000). Spirituality: Description, 
measurement, and relation to the five factor 
model of personality. Journal of Personality, 
68(1), 153–197. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
6494.t01-1-00094
MacDonald, D. A. (2009). Identity and spirituality: 
Conventional and transpersonal perspectives. 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 28, 
86–106. https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2009.28.1.86
MacDonald, D. A., & Friedman, H. L. (2002). 
Assessment of humanistic, transpersonal, and 
spiritual constructs: State of the science. Journal 
of Humanistic Psychology, 42(3), 102–125. 
https://doi.org/ 10.1177/002216702237126
MacDonald, D. A., & Friedman, H. L. (2009). 
Measures of spiritual and transpersonal constructs 
for use in yoga research. International Journal of 
Yoga, 2(1), 2–12. https://doi.org/10.4103/0973-
6131.53837
MacDonald, D. A., & Friedman, H. L. (2013). 
Quantitative assessment of transpersonal 
and spiritual constructs. The Wiley-Blackwell 
handbook of transpersonal psychology, 281–299. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118591277.ch15
MacDonald, D. A., Friedman, H. L., Brewczynski, J., 
Holland, D., Salagame, K. K. K., Mohan, K. K. ... 
Cheong, H. W. (2015). Spirituality as a scientific 
construct: Testing its universality across cultures 
and languages. PLoS One, 10(3), e0117701. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0117701
MacDonald, D. A., Friedman, H. L., & Kuentzel, 
J. G. (1999). A survey of measures of spiritual 
and transpersonal constructs: Part one-research 
update. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 
31(2), 137–154.
MacDonald, D. A., & Kuentzel, J. G. (1999). A 
survey of measures of spiritual and transpersonal 
constructs: Part two-additional instruments. 
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 31(2), 155–
177.
MacDonald, D. A., LeClair, L., Holland, C. J., 
Alter, A., & Friedman, H. L. (1995). A survey of 
measures of transpersonal constructs. Journal of 
Transpersonal Psychology, 27(2), 171–235.
Mack, J. (1993). Foreward. In R. Walsh & F. Vaughn 
(Eds.), Paths beyond ego: The transpersonal 
vision (pp. xi-xiii). New York, NY: Jeremy P. 
Tarcher.
Mendez, D. M., & MacDonald, D. A. (2012). 
Spirituality and the MMPI-2 Restructured Clinical 
Scales. International Journal of Transpersonal 
Studies, 31(1), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.24972/
ijts.2012.31.1.1
Mendez, D. M., & MacDonald, D. A. (2017). The 
measurement of spirituality in children: An 
evaluation of the Expressions of Spirituality 
Inventory–Revised (ESI–R) with a sample of 
Peruvian school children. International Journal 
of Transpersonal Studies, 36(1), 122–136.
Nagel, T. (1974). The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 
435–450. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies xiv  Hartelius 
Nagel, T. (1986). View from nowhere. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Norris, P. (1989). Current conceptual trends in 
biofeedback and self-regulation. In A. Sheikh 
(Ed.), Eastern and Western approaches to healing 
(pp. 264–295). New York, NY: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Pelletier, K. R., & Horrigan, B. (2002). Mindbody 
medicine. Alternative Therapies in Health and 
Medicine, 8(6), 90–99.
Pelletier, K. R., & Peper, E. (1977) Developing a 
biofeedback model: Alpha EEG feedback as a 
means for pain control. International Journal 
of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 25(4), 
361–371. https://doi.org/10.1080/002071477084 
15991
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rothberg, D. (1986). Philosophical foundations of 
transpersonal psychology: An introduction to 
some basic issues. Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology, 18(1), 1-34.
Schwarz, J. (2000). The Jack Schwarz method of 
autogenics. Grants Pass, OR: Schwarz.
Schwarz, J. (2001). Human energy systems: A way 
of good health using our electromagnetic 
fields. Grants Pass, OR: Schwarz. https://doi.
org/10.1088/1126-6708/2001/03/032
Sherman, J. H. (2008). A genealogy of participation. 
In J. N. Ferrer & J. H. Sherman (Eds.), The 
participatory turn: Spirituality, mysticism, religious 
studies (pp. 81–112). Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press.
St. John, D., & MacDonald, D. A. (2007). 
Development and initial validation of a measure 
of ecopsychological self. Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology, 39(1), 48–67.
Strawson, G. (2006a). Realistic monism: Why 
physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 3–31.
Strawson, G. (2006b). Panpsychism? Reply to 
commen-tators with a celebration of Descartes. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 
184–280.
Strawson, G. (2019). What does “physical” mean? 
A prolegomenon to physicalist panpsychism. 
In W. Seager (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of 
panpsychism (draft, n.p.). Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 
UK: Routledge.
Tarnas, R. (1991). The passion of the Western mind: 
Understanding the ideas that have shaped our 
world view. New York, NY: Ballantine Books.
Tart, C. T. (1972). States of consciousness and state-
specific sciences. Science, 176, 1203–1210. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.176.4040.1203
Tart, C. T. (2004). On the scientific foundations 
of transpersonal psychology: Contributions 
from parapsychology. Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology, 36(1), 66–90.
Taylor, S. (2016). From philosophy to phenomen-
ology: The argument for a “soft” perennialism. 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 
35(2), 17–41. https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2016.35.2.17
Taylor, S. (2017a). The return of perennial perspectives? 
Why transpersonal psychology should remain 
open to essentialism. International Journal of 
Transpersonal Studies, 36(2), 75–92 (this issue). 
https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.75
Taylor, S. (2017b). Keeping the account open: 
Metaphysical mistrust and ideology in transpersonal 
psychology (A response to Hartelius, 2017). 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 36(2), 
111–120. https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.111
Taylor, S. (2017c). Moving beyond materialism: 
Can transpersonal psychology contribute to 
cultural transformation? International Journal of 
Transpersonal Studies, 36(2), 111–120. https://
doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.147
Taylor, S. (2018). Two modes of sudden spiritual 
awakening? Ego-dissolution and explosive 
energetic awakening. International Journal of 
Transpersonal Studies, 37(2). https://doi.org/10. 
24972/ijts.2018.37.2.131
Walsh, R. (1997). Science and religion—proposals for 
reconciliation: An essay review of Ken Wilber’s 
The marriage of sense and soul: Integrating 
science and religion. Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology, 29(2), 123–142.
Washburn, M. (2003). Transpersonal dialogue: A new 
direction. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 
35(1), 1–19.
Wilber, K. (1975). Psychologica perennis: The 
spectrum of consciousness. Journal of 
Transpersonal Psychology, 7(2), 105–132.
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies xvScience and a Whole Person Psychology
Wilber, K. (1999). Spirituality and developmental 
lines: Are there stages? Journal of Transpersonal 
Psychology, 31(1), 1–10.
Wilber, K. (2006). Integral spirituality: A startling new 
role for religion in the modern and postmodern 
world. Boston, MA: Shambhala.
About the Author
Glenn Hartelius, PhD, is Founding Director of an 
online PhD program in Integral and Transpersonal 
Psychology at the California Institute of Integral 
Studies (CIIS) in San Francisco, where he serves 
as Professor. He is also leading an initiative to 
develop a new research facility at CIIS for research 
in whole person neuroscience. In addition to his 
work as main editor for the International Journal of 
Transpersonal Studies, he is co-editor of The Wiley-
Blackwell Handbook of Transpersonal Psychology 
and Secretary of the International Transpersonal 
Association. His research on the definition and 
scope of transpersonal psychology has helped to 
define the field. He has also taught at the Institute 
of Transpersonal Psychology, Naropa University, 
Saybrook University, and Middlesex University in 
the UK.
About the Journal
The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 
is a peer-reviewed academic journal in print since 
1981. It is sponsored by the California Institute of 
Integral Studies, published by Floraglades Founda-
tion, and serves as the official publication of the In-
ternational Transpersonal Association. The journal 
is available online at www.transpersonalstudies.org, 
and in print through www.lulu.com (search for IJTS).
